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TOURO LAW REVIEW
In re Holtzman45 9
(decided July 1, 1991)
The petitioner, Elizabeth Holtzman, claimed that the letter of
reprimand she received for publicly accusing Judge Irving Levine
of severe judicial misconduct violated her right of free speech
under the Federal460 and New York State Constitutions, 461 and
that the particular disciplinary rules, DR 1-102(A)(5), (6) and
DR 8-102(b), under which she was charged were void for
vagueness. 462 The court of appeals, in a per curtiam decision,
held that petitioner's conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(6), 463 that
the disciplinary rule was not unconstitutionally void for
vagueness, 464 and that the application of the disciplinary rule was
not a violation of Holtzman's right to free speech under either the
Federal Constitution or the New York State Constitution. 465
On December 1, 1987, Elizabeth Holtzman, then District
Attorney of Kings County, New York, released a letter to the
press that accused Judge Levine of humiliating and demeaning a
rape victim during a non-jury trial before him. 466 Holtzman's
letter stated that:
Judge Levine asked the Assistant District Attorney, defense
counsel, defendant, court officer and court reporter to join him
in the robing room, where the judge then asked the victim to get
down on the floor and show the position she was in when she
was being sexually assaulted .... [T]he victim reluctantly got
down on her hands and knees as everyone stood and watched. In
making the victim assume the position she was forced to take
when she was sexually assaulted, Judge Levine profoundly de-
459. 78 N.Y.2d 184, 577 N.E.2d 30, 573 N.Y.S.2d 39, cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 648 (1991).
460. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
461. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8.
462. Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 190, 577 N.E.2d at 32, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
463. Id.; DR 1-102(A)(6) is now DR 1-102(A)(7) pursuant to a 1990
amendment to the Code of Professional Responsibility. See N.Y. JUD. LAW
APP. DR 1-102(A)(7) (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1992).
464. Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 190, 577 N.E.2d at 32, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
465. Id. at 192, 577 N.E.2d at 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
466. Id. at 188-89, 577 N.E.2d at 31, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 40.
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graded, humiliated and demeaned her.467
Robert Keating, Administrative Judge of the New York City
Criminal Court, conducted an investigation of the accusations
made by Holtzman against Judge Levine. 468 He found that the
accusations were not supported by the evidence and referred the
matter to the New York State Grievance Committee for the Tenth
Judicial District to investigate Holtzman's possible violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. 469
Six months later, the Committee voted to issue Holtzman a pri-
vate letter of admonition for her violation of DR 8-102(B), and
DR 8-102(A)(5) and (6). DR 8-102(B) states that "[a] lawyer
shall not knowingly make false accusations against a judge or
other adjudicatory officer." 470 DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6) state re-
spectively that "a lawyer shall not: . . . (5) engage in conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; and (6) engage
in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fit-
ness to practice law." 471 In July 1988, Holtzman exercised her
right to a subcommittee hearing and was served with formal
charges. 472 Charge one, the only charge on appeal, contained
allegations of Holtzman's unfitness to practice law.473 The
charge against Elizabeth Holtzman alleged that she:
[R]elease[d]... the letter to the media (1) prior to obtaining the
minutes of the criminal trial, (2) without making any effort to
speak with court officers, the court reporter, defense counsel or
any other person present during the alleged misconduct, (3)
without meeting with or discussing the incident with the trial
assistant who reported it, and (4) with the knowledge that Judge
Levine was being transferred out of the Criminal Court, and the
matter would be investigated by the Court's Administrative
Judge as well as the Commission on Judicial Conduct .... 474
467. Id.
468. Id. at 189, 577 N.E.2d at 32, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
469. Id.
470. N. Y. JD. LAW APP. DR 8-102(b) (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1992).
471. Id. DR 1-102(A)(5)-(6).
472. Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 189, 577 N.E.2d at 32, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
473. Id.
474. Id. at 189-90, 577 N.B.2d at 32, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
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After the hearing, the subcommittee reported back to the full
committee, which voted to issue Holtzman a private letter of
reprimand for her violation of DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6) but failed
to mention DR 8-102(B). 4 75 Holtzman then appealed to the
appellate division, second department, which upheld the letter of
reprimand based upon DR 1-102(A)(6) and DR 8-102(B). 476 The
court of appeals stated that "we [agree] with both the Grievance
Committee and the Appellate Division that [Holtzman'sl conduct
violated DR 1-102(A)(6) and we reach no other question.,, 477
First, the court stated that because the charge that Holtzman's
accusations were false "was sustained by the Committee and
upheld by the Appellate Division," 478 that finding of falsity was
binding. The court then addressed Holtzman's contention that her
conduct did not violate any disciplinary rule and her contention
that the rules under which she was charged were void for
vagueness. The court began its analysis by stating that "'it is
difficult, if not impossible, to enumerate and define, with
precision, every offense for which an attorney or counselor ought
to be removed.' 479 The court further stated that broad standards
are permissible and often necessary. These broad standards are
found in DR 1-102. More specifically, the court noted that DR 1-
102(A)(5) and (6) were refined by the drafters of the Code of
Professional Responsibility in order "to provide attorneys with
proper ethical guidelines." ' 480 The court refused to find broad
language such as that in DR 1-102(A)(6) impermissibly vague.
The court determined that "the guiding principle must be
whether a reasonable attorney, familiar with the Code and its
ethical strictures, would have notice of what conduct is pro-
scribed." 481 Based on that standard, the court concluded that
petitioner was "plainly on notice that her conduct. . . could ...
475. Id. at 190, 577 N.E.2d at 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
476. Id.
477. Id. at 190, 577 N.E.2d at 32, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
478. Id. at 190, 577 N.E.2d at 32-33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41-42.
479. Id. at 190-91, 577 N.E.2d at 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 42 (quoting Ex
parte Secombe, 60 U.S. 9, 14 (1856)).
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reflect adversely on her fitness to practice law," ' 482 as DR 1-
102(a)(6) provides. In support of this conclusion, the court noted
that Holtzman's own staff had advised her to delay the publica-
tion of the letter until they were able to review the trial minutes.
The court also noted that Holtzman's accusations were "made
without any support other than the interoffice memoranda of a
newly admitted trial assistant.' 4 83 Based on those facts, the court
found that "petitioner knew or should have known that such at-
tacks are unwarranted and unprofessional, serve to bring the
Bench and Bar into disrepute, and tend to undermine public con-
fidence in the judicial system." 484
The court, expressly declining to apply DR 8-102(B), held that
petitioner's conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(6). 485 The court failed
to mention or apply DR 1-102(A)(5) to Holtzman's conduct.
The court then addressed Holtzman's contention that her
conduct was protected as free speech under the "actual malice"
standard as set down in New York imes v. Sullivan.486 Although
not mentioned in the case, Holtzman argued that the New York
State Constitution would protect her speech, even if the United
States Constitution did not.487 The test from New York Times is
that a public official cannot recover damages for defamation
unless he or she can prove, first, that the statement was false, and
second, that it was published with "'actual malice' - that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not."' 488 The New York Court of Appeals,
however, stated that "[n]either this Court nor the Supreme Court
has ever extended the [actual malice] standard to lawyer
discipline and we decline to do so here." 489




485. Id. at 192, 577 N.E.2d at 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
486. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
487. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 31-32, In re Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d.
184, 577 N.E.2d 30, 573 N.Y.S.2d 39, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 648 (1991).
488. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
489. Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 192, 577 N.E.2d at 34, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
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standard in lawyer discipline cases would enable attorneys to
make reckless and irresponsible accusations as long as they did
not "entertain serious doubts as to their truth. '"490 This result
"would be wholly at odds" 491 with the underlying policy of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Additionally, the court
distinguished defamation cases from attorney discipline cases by
characterizing an attorney's misconduct as a wrong against
society, rather than as a wrong against an individual. Therefore,
falsely accusing a judge of misconduct may not only harm the
judge individually, but may also have a negative effect on the
administration of justice as a whole, as well as call into question
the attorney's judgment. 492
Rather than extend the more protective New York Times
standard to attorney discipline cases, the court opted for a less
protective objective standard. The court stated that "[ifln order to
adequately protect the public interest and maintain the integrity of
the judicial system, there must be an objective standard of what a
reasonable attorney would do in similar circumstances." ' 493
Under this standard, it is the objective reasonableness of the
belief in the truth of the statement, not the attorney's particular
belief, that is considered. Therefore, based on this standard,
Holtzman's conduct violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility. 494
The most recent United States Supreme Court decision involv-
ing attorney discipline is Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada.495
Although the attorney in the Gentile case was charged under a
completely different disciplinary rule than Holtzman, the opinion
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Id. (citing In re Terry, 394 N.E.2d 94, 95 (Ind. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1077 (1980)).
493. Id. at 192-93, 577 N.E.2d at 34, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 43 (citing Louisiana
State Bar Ass'n v. Karst, 428 So. 2d 406, 409 (La. 1983)).
494. Id.
495. 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991); see also In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 637-38
(1985) (the chief judge of the circuit stated that petitioner's letter was "totally
disrespectful to the federal courts and to the judicial system," and that unless
petitioner apologized, the court would issue an order directing petitioner to
show cause why he should not be suspended from practice).
916 [Vol 8
5
et al.: Freedom of Speech and the Press
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
FREEDOM OF SPEECH & PRESS
did address the issue of attorney speech. A plurality of the Court
found that the Nevada rule prohibiting attorney statements that
may prejudice an ongoing trial was void for vagueness. 496 Justice
Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court on the free speech is-
sue. The Chief Justice balanced the attorney's First Amendment
rights against the state's interest in regulating attorney conduct.
The Court held that the right to a fair trial outweighs an attor-
ney's First Amendment rights.497
Other state courts have addressed cases similar to Holzman
with varied results on the free speech issue. In New Jersey, a
clear and present danger standard is applied. 498 In California, the
New York Times standard was found to be appropriate in attorney
speech cases.4 99 Kentucky and Missouri, however, treat attorney
speech exactly the same way as the court of appeals did in
Holtzman, and apply a reasonable attorney standard. 500
It appears that the Supreme Court would hold that the societal
interests involved in a case like Holtzman outweigh the attorney's
First Amendment rights.501 In fact, the Court has not shown any
desire to change the result achieved in cases like Holtzman and In
re Westfall.502 Therefore, for the immediate future, the law in
New York is that an attorney must act reasonably when accusing
a judge of misconduct.
496. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2732.
497. Id. at 2745.
498. See In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483 (N.J. 1982).
499. See Ramirez v. State Bar of California, 619 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1980).
500. See In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829 (Mo.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
648 (1991); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Heleringer, 602 S.W.2d 165 (Ky. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101 (1981).
501. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457
U.S. 423, 434 (1982) ("The ultimate object of such control is the 'protection
of the public. . . ."'); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792
(1975) (stating that "as part of their power to protect the public health, safety
and other valid interests [states] have broad powers to establish standards for
licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions.").
502. See In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829 (Mo.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
648 (1991). In Westfall, the court held that an attorney's televised statements
alleging purposeful dishonest conduct on behalf of a judge were sanctionable.
Id. at 838. The court applied a reasonable attorney standard. Id. at 836.
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